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Abstract
Surrogacy involves one woman (surrogate mother) carrying a child for another person/s
(commissioning person/couple), based on a mutual agreement requiring the child to be handed
over to the commissioning person/couple following birth. Reasons for seeking surrogacy include
situations where a woman has non-functional or absent reproductive organs, or as a remedy for
recurrent pregnancy loss. Additionally, surrogacy may find application in any medical context where
pregnancy is contraindicated, or where a couple consisting of two males seek to become parents
through oocyte donation. Gestational surrogacy is one of the main issues at the forefront of
bioethics and the advanced reproductive technologies, representing an important challenge to
medical law. This analysis reviews the history of surrogacy and clinical and legal issues pertaining to
this branch of reproductive medicine. Interestingly, the Medical Council of Ireland does not
acknowledge surrogacy in its current practice guidelines, nor is there specific legislation addressing
surrogacy in Ireland at present. We therefore have developed a contract-based model for
surrogacy in which, courts in Ireland may consider when confronted with a surrogacy dispute, and
formulated a system to resolve any potential dispute arising from a surrogacy arrangement. While
the 2005 report by the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (CAHR) is an expert
opinion guiding the Oireachtas' development of specific legislation governing assisted human
reproduction and surrogacy, our report represents independent scholarship on the contractual
elements of surrogacy with particular focus on how Irish courts might decide on surrogacy matters
in a modern day Ireland. This joint medico-legal collaborative also reviews the contract for services
arrangement between the commissioning person/s and the surrogate, and the extent to which the
contract may be enforced.
Background
Surrogacy describes an alternate means of conception for
individuals who are unable to conceive a child naturally.
In surrogacy, one woman (surrogate mother) carries a
child for another person/s (commissioning person/cou-
ple), based on an agreement before conception requiring
the child to be handed over to the commissioning person/
couple following birth.
The basic idea of surrogacy is an understandably private
matter. Yet there is nothing new in the concept of surro-
gacy, which probably began with civilisation itself. While
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Biblical references include Sarah (Genesis 16:4) and
Rachel (Genesis 30:3), perhaps less well-known allusions
to surrogacy date from 1500 B.C. and are found among
the artefacts of the Hurrians of Mesopotamia [1]. Cer-
tainly surrogacy was practiced in classic Greek society as
early as the 4th century B.C. [2], and in medieval Tuscany,
one mother's daily correspondence preserved from
around the year A.D.1500 provides another perspective of
surrogacy [3]. The longest intact personal inscription that
survives from ancient Rome (known as Laudatio Turiae–a
late 1st century B.C. epitaph) includes a tender reference to
surrogacy as antiquity's common-sense remedy to child-
lessness [4].
Contemporary advances in medical science have taken the
application of surrogacy to a new level of sophistication,
and over the past two decades surrogacy has attracted leg-
islative attention worldwide. In clinical practice, surrogacy
includes arrangements whereby a woman agrees to
become pregnant (either by artificial insemination or via
embryo transfer), and carry a child to term with the intent
to relinquish custody of that child upon its birth to the
couple with whom she has made the agreement [5]. This
agreement has the practical effect of causing a purposeful
conception followed by voluntary surrender of the off-
spring by the birth mother, or shortly after birth [6].
A surrogate may have a purely altruistic reason for agree-
ing to carry a child for someone else, but generally this is
done in exchange for compensation to the surrogate
mother. Recent research has challenged the cultural
assumption that "normal" women do not voluntarily
become pregnant with the premeditated intent to surren-
der the child for money [7]. General public acceptance of
this is increasing but remains somewhat limited [8].
Regarding the level of support for surrogacy, considerable
variation exists across population sub-groups with some
of this perception appearing to be influenced by prevail-
ing media portrayals of surrogacy [9].
While generally favourable legislation relating to IVF had
appeared in several jurisdictions by the end of the 1980's,
this level of acceptance did not initially extend to surro-
gacy. For example, South Africa, England and Australia
had produced essentially negative legislation on surrogacy
by 1990 [10]. Even though the United Kingdom's Surro-
gacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SAA 1985) [11] prohibits
payments for surrogacy arrangements, financial compen-
sation and reimbursement of reasonable expenses to the
surrogate are considered lawful. This contrasts with the
United States model where (depending on the State) a
surrogate may be paid for the service of carrying the child
to term. The main concern with the SAA is that, even
where a surrogate has agreed to carry to term a child which
comprises of the gametes of the commissioning couple,
under the latter Act, the surrogate will be regarded as the
legal parent of the offspring, even though she holds no
genetic tie with the child.
Although distinct types of surrogacy exist and the defini-
tions of each have occasionally resulted in confusion, the
status of the surrogate herself (the woman carrying the
child) determines the type of surrogacy. Does the surro-
gate have a direct genetic link to the child? How this ques-
tion is answered establishes the classification of each
surrogacy arrangement:
1. Partial Surrogacy (traditional surrogacy): This is cur-
rently the most common form of surrogacy arrange-
ment, where the carrying female is fertilised with the
commissioning male's sperm (either by sexual inter-
course or assisted insemination). Because this type of
surrogacy does not rely on the advanced reproductive
technologies, partial surrogacy may be undertaken pri-
vately without the aid of a medical practitioner.
2. Full Surrogacy (gestational surrogacy): This relies on in
vitro fertilisation (IVF) and therefore involves minor
surgery and the expertise of highly trained medical
staff. The commissioning couple may provide both
sperm and ovum, while the surrogate provides the
uterus where the resulting embryo created by IVF is
transferred.
In the latter arrangement, the resulting child shares the
same genetic composition as the commissioning couple,
providing that both the sperm and ovum of the couple
were used, whereas in the former arrangement, the child
is genetically related to both the commissioning father
and the surrogate mother (as the oocyte source). When a
dispute arises, the genetic makeup of the child usually car-
ries judicial weight in deciding where a child is more suit-
ably placed. A typical surrogacy contract would stipulate
the objective of the contract including the intention of the
commissioning person(s) to be the legal parents of the
child. The surrogate would merely be providing a service
which is necessary in order for the contract to be carried
out. Strict application of the principles of contract law
would conclude that a child born through gestational sur-
rogacy, thereby exclusively comprising the genetic
makeup of the commissioning couple (or partly, where
the sperm or ovum of one of the parties was donated),
should never be legally classified as offspring of the surro-
gate (as appears to be the case in some countries) simply
because the surrogate delivered the infant.
Similarly, with partial surrogacy the courts typically inter-
fere only when confronted with a custody dispute and in
particular, when required to determine the best interests
of the child. It may be claimed that both the commission-Reproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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ing couple and the surrogate mother would have an equal
legal right to claim custody of the child in this context.
However, as noted above with full/gestational surrogacy,
the surrogate has no genetic connection to the offspring
and therefore the commissioning person(s) should have a
stronger claim to be awarded custody. Thus, depending
on the particulars of the agreement between the parties,
the courts, as will be seen throughout this paper, should
reserve judgement until all the facts are delicately assessed
with reference to the following; the intention of the par-
ties, the genetic parent/s of the child and most impor-
tantly, the best interests of the child.
Current Legal Position in Ireland
At present, Ireland has no legislation governing surrogacy
arrangements or any forms of assisted reproductive medi-
cine. The Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction
(CAHR), chaired by Dr. Deirdre Madden of University
College Cork, concluded in 2005 as the government's first
attempt to address the need for statutory regulation in the
area of assisted human reproduction [12]. Overall the
CAHR report was widely accepted as being a positive step
parallel to other EU jurisdictions. The portion of the Com-
mission's report specifically dealing with surrogacy may
be seen as a reflection of current society's social, moral,
and ethical milieu. The report recommended that there
should be "no prohibitions regarding marital status, gender or
sexual orientation of the commissioning person(s)", and as
such, is generally viewed as taking a progressive step
towards a socially diverse Ireland.
Although the Oireachtas Health Committee (OHC) has
assessed the findings of the CAHR report, thus far, no Par-
liamentary action has resulted from the work of the OHC.
Until the Oireachtas passes a law specifically addressing
surrogacy, Ireland will remain a blank slate leaving it to
the judiciary to determine what rights either party in a sur-
rogacy arrangement may have. In the absence of relevant
legislation here, women in Ireland have very limited
access to surrogacy and only recently have pregnancies
from surrogacy here been described [13]. Estimates of the
number of Irish couples participating in surrogacy
arrangements outside of Ireland are difficult to calculate,
however a voluntary organisation based in the United
Kingdom, Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy
(COTS), has records of its agency assisting 10 Irish cou-
ples to become parents to 15 children over the years with
no disputes arising from such arrangements (personal com-
munication).
In an Irish context, if a surrogacy arrangement were to
require adjudication now, it is likely that judges would
look to the Medical Council of Ireland (IMC) as the statu-
tory body empowered to regulate the practice of medicine
at a national level. One of the functions of the IMC is to
provide guidance on professional ethics to physicians,
and the Council publishes its "Guide to Ethical Conduct
& Behaviour" every five years for this purpose. However,
the IMC has not been progressive about regulating the
advanced reproductive technologies. For example, a pro-
vision restricting IVF only to married couples was retained
until 1994, and the most recent edition of the IMC ethical
"Guide" (2004) did not even mention surrogacy [14].
The Irish judiciary also could turn to precepts of common
law supplemented by the 1937 Irish Constitution [15].
The closest statute that might reasonably be applied in
this setting would approximate the same set of facts per-
taining to the adoption of a child by the commissioning
couple, and would therefore be conditional upon the sur-
rogate mother relinquishing custody after approval by the
Adoption Board, under the Adoption Acts 1952–1998 [16].
This hypothesis leads to the issue of whether the Adoption
Acts 1952–1998 in their present state, would fit properly
as part of a solution to disputed surrogacy arrangements.
At least two factors must be addressed for this analysis.
First, the Adoption Acts stipulate that a mother cannot
lawfully relinquish her parental rights by offering a child
for adoption before its birth, even if she wishes to do so.
The CAHR's dissenting opinion position paper on surro-
gacy focused strongly on this key distinction, and specu-
lated that this aspect of the Adoption Acts was specifically
crafted with a view to keep mothers from recklessly waiv-
ing a constitutional right, until it was absolutely clear that
they had a full understanding of what they were, in fact,
giving up [17]. An effort to resolve a surrogacy dispute by
applying the Adoption Acts 1952–1998 is therefore prob-
lematic, because all surrogacy contracts depend on the
parties' mutual agreement well in advance of conception.
The second issue deals with the Adoption Acts' treatment
of payment to the birth parents. In surrogacy arrange-
ments, some form of monetary compensation would
almost invariably pass from the commissioning person/s
to the surrogate (birth mother). This may be so even in the
context of a genuinely altruistic arrangement, where the
commissioning person/s offset the costs of the delivery
procedure, and perhaps clinic expenses associated with
prenatal care. Although such expenses may only cover the
above procedures, this trace level of economic involve-
ment may be regarded as a contravention of the Adoption
Acts.
When this matter was investigated in 2007, the Irish
Adoption Board indicated that it receives at least two
applications per year from commissioning couples seek-
ing to adopt a child born through surrogacy. The Board
has permitted the commissioning person/s to cover the
general expenses of the surrogate so long as this arrange-Reproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
Page 4 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
ment is not coercive or driven by profit. This is so, even
though Section 42 of the Principal Act clearly states that
any payment or other reward will be in direct contraven-
tion of the Act. However, one must bare in mind that the
principal Act was penned in 1952 and did not foresee the
practical realities and difficulties in conceiving – nor did it
foresee the plethora of contemporary advances in medical
science.
The practical effect of this (permitting the adoption by the
Board), in an Irish context, means that similar payments
(provided they are reasonable) flowing from the commis-
sioning person/s to the surrogate are very unlikely to be
viewed as a contravention of the Adoption Act. However,
when evaluating surrogacy disputes, the courts need to
contemplate a number of key factors including the biolog-
ical (genetic) status of the child, the contractual intention
of the parties, and most importantly, the best interests of
the child. The matter of 'reasonable expenses' should also be
assessed to the extent that this is a necessary element of
the surrogacy arrangement, yet assuming the above factors
were properly considered, the issue of expenses would not
hinder the true essence of the contract and would become
only of secondary importance.
Surrogacy Models in Foreign Jurisdictions
Given the absence of relevant Irish legislation and case
law specific to surrogacy, it is useful to explore jurisdic-
tional strategies adopted by persuasive authorities else-
where. Although there are several countries that have, in
either a legislative or judicial capacity, established legal
precedent on issues pertaining to surrogacy, two (i.e.,
United Kingdom and California) are studied here with a
view to compare and contrast these approaches.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the legislation pertaining to sur-
rogacy is the SAA 1985 [11]. This legislation came in
response to a highly publicised surrogacy case known as
'Baby Cotton' [18]. This case arose prior to the introduction
of the SAA and involved a partial surrogacy arrangement
that had been set up through a commercial agency in the
United States. The surrogate agreed to be inseminated
with the commissioning fathers' sperm and, upon the
birth of the child resulting from this procedure, was con-
tent to relinquish custody. When a custody dispute arose,
the local court intervened and Baby Cotton was temporar-
ily made a ward of court. Mr. Justice Latey found the com-
missioning couple to be suitable parents and ultimately
ruled that the sole care and custody of the child should be
awarded to them, and that they were therefore permitted
to take the child out of the United Kingdom.
The first case addressing a disputed surrogacy arrange-
ment in the United Kingdom was actually decided in
1978, although it was not reported until 1985 [19] when
the controversial Baby Cotton case came before the courts.
In that first judicial exploration of contested parentage
arising from surrogacy, the court held that "the agreement
was void on the grounds of public policy", but subse-
quently gave the child's biological father visitation rights.
The Baby Cotton story attracted considerable media atten-
tion and was subsequently drawn into Parliamentary
debates, which began to question the a priori moral
acceptability of surrogacy itself. Against this background,
the SSA 1985 was passed which prohibited the commer-
cialisation of surrogacy by third-parties or agencies, but
did not prevent the act of surrogacy itself. Since its enact-
ment, the Act has received criticism on the basis that it was
enacted due to "moral panic" [20] and was described as a
"stopgap measure driving surrogacy underground" [21].
While the Act was created with the laudable goal of com-
bating the commercialisation of surrogacy in the United
Kingdom, it was unclear how the exchange of money
would be "less commercial" if given directly to the surro-
gate mother by the commissioning couple, instead of by
an agency (ostensibly acting on behalf of the commission-
ing person/s). The SAA 1985 therefore aimed to discour-
age surrogacy arrangements by prohibiting
intermediaries, but in practical terms it had the effect of
proliferating amateur surrogacy agreements by outlawing
professional, experienced help. It may be argued that legal
advice and formal counselling for the surrogate mother
has value, as it would reduce the risk of separation issues
that may be encountered when she delivers the child,
compared to the circumstance where the surrogate mother
would not have access to such resources. The involvement
of a regulated agency providing this professional service
(for a fee defrayed by the commissioning person/s), may
thus be seen as contributing a highly technical yet benefi-
cial service to inform all parties as they contemplate enter-
ing a surrogacy arrangement.
Under English law, the woman who physically gives birth
to the child is currently classified as the legal mother irre-
spective of whether she is the genetic mother of the child.
This means that in the United Kingdom the commission-
ing mother, who may in fact be the genetic mother of the
child, will never automatically acquire legal parental
responsibility for a child born through a surrogacy
arrangement [22]. It should be noted that the SSA 1985
prohibits any agency to facilitate commercial surrogacy
arrangements and prohibits advertisements for surrogates
or to recruit a surrogate in the United Kingdom. In con-
trast, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
(HFEA 1990) [23] confirms the common law position
that such contracts are unenforceable in the United King-
dom. HFEA 1990 does not specifically address surrogacyReproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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arrangements, but S.30 does provide measures the com-
missioning couple may take in applying for adoption or
guardianship rights.
From this analysis, it may be concluded that English law
does not presently prohibit surrogacy arrangements but
does criminalise them if such agreements include a com-
mercial element. Any contracts made of a commercial
nature, beyond what may be deemed as covering reason-
able expenses will be declared void in accordance with
English law [24]. The legal approach to surrogacy in the
United Kingdom has also been criticised because it
regards as irrelevant the intention of the parties involved.
This is perhaps best illustrated in sec. 27 of HFEA 1990
which states that a surrogate is defined as the legal mother
of the child born, even though she may be genetically
unrelated to the child and have no wish to be held as its
legal mother.
State of California (USA)
In the 1993 case Johnson v. Calvert [25], the California
Supreme Court extended existing California Family Law
statutes to protect all parties in surrogacy arrangements
and in oocyte donation pregnancies. Johnson v. Calvert
presented a straightforward example of a dispute arising
from a gestational surrogacy agreement. The commission-
ing woman, Crispina Calvert, had undergone a hysterec-
tomy and was therefore unable to carry a child but still
had ovaries and was therefore able to produce her own
eggs. She and her husband entered into an agreement with
a surrogate, Anna Johnson, to be paid a fixed fee in return
for the bringing to term the commissioning couple's child
created from their gametes. When the relationship
between the parties deteriorated, both parties applied to
the court for an order of parentage. The surrogate (carrier),
Ms. Johnson, claimed that she was being exploited due to
the fact that she was a woman of lower economic status.
The court disagreed and stated that considering the con-
tract there was no coercion or duress involved, and that
"there had been no proof that surrogacy contracts exploit
poor women...". The California State Supreme Court
affirmed the lower Court ruling that a gestational surro-
gacy contract was legal and binding.
The California Court further reasoned that there were two
distinct ways to prove maternity using an existing statute
(i.e., California Family Law Code). The first method was
by proof of giving physical birth to the child, and the sec-
ond method was by proof of genetic consanguinity
(blood tests). But since Johnson v. Calvert involved twodif-
ferent women who could each fulfil different parts of the
statutory requirements, the Court held that the woman
who intended to "bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own – is the natural mother under
California law."
An earlier analysis of this case [26] concluded that the Cal-
ifornia Court appreciated the complexities of IVF and the
level of planning and coordination needed to achieve a
pregnancy, and regarded the intellectual conception of the
child as being the fundamental cause of the child's crea-
tion, "But for the commissioning parents setting out to
find a surrogate to carry their embryo, this child would
have never come into existence." In other words, if the
commissioning couple takes the necessary logistical steps
to identify and engage a surrogate mother with the inten-
tion of the surrogate carrying to term a child that is genet-
ically related to one (or both) of the parties, and the
surrogate voluntarily agrees to such terms, then that con-
tract should in all instances be given validity in favour of
the commissioning couple based on that intent.
This important California decision is in contrast to some
other jurisdictions in the Unites States where absolute
prohibition on surrogacy has been effected by completely
banning the practice. The New Jersey Supreme Court
decided a well-known American surrogacy case, In the
Matter of Baby M [27], holding that the agreement itself
was void but nevertheless awarded custody to the com-
missioning couple. California law has paved the way for
prospective parents, surrogates, and egg donors to be rea-
sonably certain that their intentions, as expressed by their
formal surrogacy agreement, will be respected. California
courts have consistently upheld the intended parents'
rights and obligations of parenthood when they use a sur-
rogate or egg donor to help create a family. This result will
generally hold true regardless of whether the parents use
their own genetic material, donated eggs, or artificially
inseminate a surrogate.
The California approach is acknowledged as completely
opposite to that operating in the United Kingdom. In Cal-
ifornia, a contractual model is viewed as giving rise to the
rights and obligations of the joint intention of the parties
to the contract. Under a contract for services, considera-
tion is given by way of placing an embryo or commission-
ing person's sperm into the surrogate. Prior to making
such an agreement, both parties are fully aware of the
basic terms of the contract; specifically, that the surrogate
will carry the child to term with the intention that she will,
upon its birth, give that child over to the commissioning
couple.
Surrogacy Contracts
A surrogacy contract is a contract no different to any other
contract as it essentially relates to the agreement or prom-
ise made by both parties: contract law is primarily con-
cerned with agreements that involve one party, or each
party, giving an undertaking or promise to the other party
[28]. The rights and duties of the surrogate stem from two
basic promises that she makes to the commissioning cou-Reproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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ple. First, she promises to be treated with the commission-
ing couple's genetic material (partial/full surrogacy) and
carry the child to term. The surrogate will also give an
assurance that she will attend regular prenatal appoint-
ments so as to ensure the health and safety of the foetus.
Secondly, the surrogate will promise to surrender all rights
in the child to the commissioning couple. This latter
promise may become complicated if the surrogate is mar-
ried, as the law presumes that a child born to a married
woman is the child of the woman and her husband. How-
ever, this presumption is rebuttable and thus, the com-
missioning couple should from the outset, make it a term
of the contract that the surrogate and her husband explic-
itly agree to make no claim to the resulting child; without
this statement, the intention of the parties may be under-
cut. Such a provision would help reduce emotional strain
and the probability of litigation, and would avoid harm-
ing the child by involving it in custody proceedings [29].
A surrogacy arrangement based on contractual intention
should not be designed to commodify offspring. Surro-
gacy arrangements do not deal with fungibles and must
not encourage a system where children are treated as
goods that may be contracted in and out of. While the
notion of surrogacy could understandably figure centrally
in the arena of Irish family law, when examining the
matrix of relationships embraced by surrogacy, one may
see that surrogacy also has a basis in contract law. As with
all contracts, they are designed to protect the interests of
both parties as well as to bring to fruition, the express and
implied terms of the contract. This perspective derives
from the basic agreement made between the surrogate and
the commissioning couple; the surrogate agrees to carry
the foetus to term, for the benefit of the commissioning
person/s and, the latter agree to re-compensate the surro-
gate for her time and expense in carrying out said proce-
dure, of which, would not be possible without her
agreement.
A proposed contractual model for surrogacy in Ireland
could effectively be based on the common law principles
of freedom to contract, as enunciated in Johnson v. Calvert
[25]. From a contract law standpoint, Irish courts could
assess several factors for consideration when adjudicating
a surrogacy dispute. Assuming all elements of a valid con-
tract exist, offer and acceptance of carrying out the surrogacy
arrangement and thereby electively agreeing to all terms
of the contract, consideration would be regarded as given
by consenting to have the embryo/sperm transferred to
the surrogate's uterus, and finally, the contract would on
the birth and relinquishing of the child, be classified as
having satisfied the intention of the parties concerned and
thereby completed. It should be noted that whether the
particular terms of the contract are "reasonable" is not
technically at issue. Indeed a surrogacy contract could
consist of any number of terms/clauses, yet it may be
assumed that all such terms are reasonable because they
were freely acceded to by all parties involved [30].
Intent of the parties
"Intention" in a surrogacy agreement connotes the same
meaning as in other legal contracts. Courts look to what
the parties intended by examining the contract in a prima
facie fashion. The contract itself should detail the provi-
sion of a service to and on behalf of the commissioning
couple (the intended parents), and the contract language
would stipulate that the fundamental purpose of the
agreement is to provide the intended parents with a child
which is genetically theirs. In consideration for the con-
tractual promise, the surrogate (or host) would be recom-
pensed for her expenses incurred during pregnancy.
Whether or not this compensation might conflict with Ire-
land's Adoption Act, as presently configured, cannot be
known with certainty. However, as mentioned above, pro-
vided such payments are viewed by the Board as "reason-
able" between the parties, the courts may infer that they
do not contravene the Acts.
Recognising the aforementioned distinctions in other
legal systems, it can be noted that courts in the United
Kingdom have ruled that the best possible approach in
relation to the issue of fees was to 'disregard the morality
or immorality of the arrangement itself...' and to decide
on the best interests of the child [18,31]. Furthermore,
California case law has further shown that courts will
award legal parentage to the intended parents of the child
irrespective of the gestational arrangements.
This was precisely demonstrated in Re Marriage of Buzza-
nca [32], where the court considered a more complicated
IVF case involving an egg donor, extending the opinions
from Johnson v. Calvert. In this conflict regarding donor
oocytes and gestational surrogacy, the Court held that
where a child is born as a result of a surrogacy arrange-
ment to a couple who are not the biological (genetic) par-
ents, the intention of that couple to become parents
would still be sufficient to render them the legal parents
of the child. The Court reasoned in Buzzanca  that the
intended mother to a surrogacy contract using a donated
egg could prove she was the mother under existing Califor-
nia Family Code Section 7610 by virtue of her consent to
undergo "...a medical procedure which results in a preg-
nancy and eventual birth of a child" [32].
When given an opportunity to decide on such complex
cases involving surrogacy disputes, Irish courts in assess-
ing legal parentage and the best interests of the child,
might seek some guidance from the legislative and judi-
cial model currently used in the United Kingdom. How-Reproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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ever, as mentioned at the introductory stage, the SAA in
the United Kingdom will only provide assistance to the
commissioning couple where the surrogate willingly
relinquishes the baby and permits the adoption. Thus, the
California model would offer wider protection to the true
and intended parents of the infant, taking into account
the best interests of the infant at all times. Alternatively,
the Irish judicial system could assess the contractual
intentions of all parties concerned, or as the court opined
in the Calvert decision, the 'intellectual conception' of the
child and the 'but for' test adopted by other jurisdictions.
These considerations should facilitate the Irish courts'
interpretation of the terms of the agreement, the status of
parentage in light of advances in modern medicine, and
most importantly, the best interests of the child.
The Constitution and contract law in Ireland: Conflicting 
philosophies?
Moral philosophers have often debated the topic of obli-
gation in relation to keeping one's promise. It is believed
that where one simply agrees to keep a particular promise,
they should be held up to that promise as moral obliga-
tions are created by an individual saying so. Accordingly,
legal philosophers are often influenced by moral philo-
sophical theories about 'promising' when exploring con-
tract-based agreements. This formulation may become
somewhat complicated when viewed in the framework of
the Irish Constitution, however.
Can it be said that the contract model combined with the
Irish Constitution advances a couple's basic right to pro-
create and establish a family? The 1937 Constitution of
the Republic of Ireland [15] explicitly acknowledges the
special status of the family as 'the natural primary and fun-
damental unit group in society', and as such recognises the
natural rights of its members. However, the well-inten-
tioned protections afforded to the Irish family by the Con-
stitution may be variously interpreted as either supporting
or proscribing the practice of surrogacy. For example, it
may be argued that the commissioning couple is pursuing
a family and the only way this goal can possibly be
achieved is through surrogacy. The couple might further
contend that if surrogacy contracts were deemed invalid,
unconstitutional, and/or unenforceable, the lack of a
legally meaningful surrogacy mechanism in Ireland
would effectively deprive them of the opportunity to have
a family–a family which in turn, is ostensibly protected by
the Constitution itself.
When deciding a case involving full (gestational) surro-
gacy, an Irish court would hear compelling arguments in
favour of the commissioning person/s since in this setting
the child would share the same genetic composition as the
commissioning couple, and have nothing in common
genetically with the surrogate. Other jurisdictions have
acknowledged that in disputed gestational surrogacy
arrangements, both women involved could be considered
the child's natural mothers. However, when intention and
genetics informed their deliberations, the California
Court regarded the legal mother as the genetic mother,
and as such, custody was awarded accordingly. Consider-
ing the family rights guaranteed within the Irish Constitu-
tion, it could be argued that this gives more emphasis on
the commissioning couple as opposed to the surrogate
(birth mother). Therefore, in order to safeguard that
familial relationship, the Irish courts could recognise a
contract-based model in the absence of specific surrogacy
legislation.
Public policy developments
In response to the widespread availability of the advanced
reproductive technologies, many jurisdictions have devel-
oped regulations and/or legislation designed to anticipate
problems or disputes arising from this technology.
Ireland
The majority of the CAHR were of the opinion that surro-
gacy should be regulated by a separate licensing body spe-
cifically for surrogacy, and also recommended the remit of
the Adoption Board be extended to include surrogacy
[12]. In assessing the contractual issues in a surrogacy
arrangement, the Commission stated that due to the vari-
ous forms of surrogacy arrangements available including
contractual, commercial, altruistic, anonymous and intra-
familial and genetic surrogacy, "the rules that may be
envisaged for one type may not necessarily fit the others"
[12].
The Commission recommended that for traditional (par-
tial) surrogacy, Irish courts would classify the surrogate as
the legal mother due to genetic and gestational reasons.
The Commission did consider the legal position in gesta-
tional (full) surrogacy, where the surrogate carries an
embryo that is not genetically her own, and stated, "both
genetics and gestation play a necessary and equally impor-
tant role in bringing the child into existence". Further-
more, the Commission discussed legal parentage in
surrogacy arrangements as follows: "the rights based on
the 'intent of reproduction', in other words what all par-
ties intended from the outset of the arrangement, should
form the basis of recommendations on legal parentage in
cases of surrogacy." [12]
After considering several options related to the legal par-
entage of a child born through surrogacy, the majority of
the panel recommended that the child born through sur-
rogacy should be 'presumed' to be that of the commission-
ing couple [12]. This position by the CAHR can direct the
Oireachtas in developing legislation to grant parental and
legal status in gestational surrogacy arrangements. ThusReproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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far, the Government has not commented on the Commis-
sion's recommendations.
United Kingdom
It has been more than 20 years since the government of
the United Kingdom produced a formal enquiry into
Human Fertilisation and Embryology, the resulting docu-
ment known as the Warnock Report [33]. This was fol-
lowed by a related regulatory effort, the Brazier Report
[34]. At the time of its publishing, the Warnock Report
assented to most forms of reproductive technology such
as IVF, artificial insemination and egg donation. Curi-
ously, the majority voice in the Warnock Report took a
rather negative view of surrogacy and predicted that it
would "disappear" or "wither on the vine." Moreover, the
Warnock Report considered surrogacy to be "inconsistent
with human dignity that a woman should use her uterus
for financial profit and treat it as an incubator for some-
one else's child." But neither the SAA 1985 nor HFEA
1990 fully embodied the recommendations of the War-
nock Report.
The Brazier Report [34] reviewed surrogacy arrangements
to ensure that "the law continued to meet public con-
cerns." Brazier recognised that since the time of the SAA
1985 and the findings of the Warnock report, public opin-
ion had changed on surrogacy, and indeed that surrogacy
had become an "acceptable alternative" to other forms of
reproductive treatments. Brazier recommended that in
order to consolidate and reform the law, a new Surrogacy
Act was needed [35]. The Brazier report contended that
"legal considerations" of surrogacy led to the conclusion
that "any financial arrangements" beyond reasonable
expenses "has to be regarded as a form of child purchase"
and thus, Brazier recommended that surrogacy contracts
containing such provisions continue to be unenforceable.
However, the Brazier Report advocated allowing surro-
gacy to continue albeit in a regulated fashion, and with
the ban on commercialisation to remain in place [34].
The Brazier Report concluded that compensation between
consensual adults for the service of bringing to term the
commissioning person/s child, should not be regarded as
an act of purchasing children but rather payment for serv-
ices rendered. In most surrogacy relationships, at least one
or both commissioning persons are in fact genetically
related to the child born from the surrogacy arrangement.
Wilson has said that where one or both parents seek to
adopt a child born through surrogacy, the Adoption Act
1952 may permit this because the arrangement is consid-
ered a form of 'step-family adoption' (where either one or
both persons are biologically related to the child). Accord-
ing to this view, the surrogate mother effectively is seen as
'surrendering or abandoning' her right to custody of the
child. Thus, payment of reasonable expenses is considered
reimbursement to the surrogate for loss of earnings and
any medical procedures carried out as a result of her serv-
ices [16].
Surrogacy contracts and Irish public policy
All contracts contain similar elements; whether the docu-
ment concerns completing renovations to one's business
or home, or agreeing to carry a child to term for someone
else. All contracts should include the structure necessary
to deem it valid: offer, acceptance, and consideration.
Even when a contract has these required components,
issues of moral consideration may complicate the ques-
tion of whether courts would hold surrogacy contracts
valid [36]. This is because all legal systems reserve the
right to declare a contract void if it is legally or morally
offensive, contrary to public policy, or if it involves the
commission of an unlawful act [28].
Grounds for invalidation
A surrogacy contract may be rendered invalid when its
terms describing compensation for "expenses" are criti-
cally viewed as exploitative, thus creating an impression
of commercialisation. Expenses have come to include
monetary payment to the surrogate for her medical treat-
ment, her loss of earnings associated with pregnancy and
other general expenses (i.e., maternity clothes and travel)
calculated at a standard consistent with current market
trends. In Ireland, this exchange of expense payments
from the commissioning person/s to the surrogate could
be contentious because the Adoption Act 1952 specifically
prohibits a birth parent from receiving or agreeing to
receive 'any payment or other reward in consideration of
the adoption of the child'. It therefore forbids any person
from giving or agreeing to give any such payment or
reward. Courts in Ireland could take the view, irrespective
of whatever label is put on the agreement, that "the reality
of the contract is that it is an agreement to pay a fee in con-
nection with an adoption", and therefore illegal [37].
English judges have tended to permit expense payments
to the surrogate, provided they are reasonable, regarding
such compensation as somewhat incidental to the agree-
ment itself. This evokes a troublesome question: If a sur-
rogacy case were to come before Irish courts today in the
absence of surrogacy legislation, would the adoption of
one's own genetic child be in contravention to the Adop-
tion Act 1952? Upon a strict reading of the Section 42, the
answer would be yes. However, as noted above, the Adop-
tion Board will not classify reasonable expenses (medical
or other) as contravening the Acts. One reason this agency
has facilitated such adoptions is because one or both of
the parents seeking the adoption is legally and genetically
the parent/s of the child they seek to adopt (personal com-
munication).Reproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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Basis of illegality
The prevailing historical view was that any act of surrogacy
diminished women and was degrading to all females. One
of the central challenges confronting surrogacy is whether
it is morally or ethically just, and whether in view of such
concerns, the courts must assess the enforceability of sur-
rogacy contracts. As such, the courts when looking at mat-
ters of public policy take account of the 'common good'
and the changing perceptions of society as the validity of
such contracts is evaluated.
Judges have never enforced contracts which, in the inter-
ests of morality and the common good, are regarded as
contrary to public policy. In a French surrogacy case
brought before the Cour de Cassation, the court held that
surrogate motherhood must be regarded as lawful and
"not contrary to public policy" and the "adoption is in
accordance with the interests of the child" [38]. Although
courts are quick to strike down illegal or morally offensive
contracts, what may once have been regarded as morally
doubtful may over time become socially and ethically
acceptable. Modern reproductive technology has given
many individuals an opportunity to create a family
through various medical and surgical procedures. In light
of these developments, it is unlikely that surrogacy would
be viewed as objectionable or morally offensive by Irish
courts. Indeed, it could be a delicate matter for a court to
disparage and invalidate a surrogacy contract without to
some degree also entangling the offspring who would be
at the very centre of the dispute. By doing so, the resulting
child would almost certainly be tainted with judicial dis-
gust, an outcome antagonistic to "the best interests of the
child" doctrine.
Although the courts of each jurisdiction seek to promote
and protect the best interests of the child, this outcome is
not always evident. An example of this may be found in
the first surrogacy dispute litigated in Australia, Re Evelyn
[39]. The outcome of this 1998 decision resulted in a
highly disruptive environment for all parties concerned.
While at the time, Australia had a complete prohibition
on surrogacy, the court did not take this into account but
decided instead to regard with more gravity the maturity
of the parties in what was described as an altruistic, well-
intentioned arrangement. However, the judge here
decided that even though Evelyn had spent two years with
her intended family, she should be returned to her birth
mother (surrogate) to be raised. The intended parents
were given shared long-term responsibility. It is antici-
pated that a ruling of this type would have limited influ-
ence on future Irish jurisprudence, as courts in Ireland
tend to rely heavily on forensic or scientific literature
which is in near universal agreement that the effect of such
"parent switching" entails substantial psychological
trauma to the child if bonds of attachment are formed and
broken with the adoptive/intended parents [40,41].
Breach of Contract & The Role of the Judiciary
Where a custody dispute arises between the surrogate and
the commissioning person/s, what approach should the
Irish courts take in resolving the dispute? It is our opinion
that any future surrogacy dispute in Ireland ideally should
be adjudicated on the basis of a Three Point Test to measure
the critical aspects of the arrangement: 1) the genetic make-
up of the child, 2) the contractual intentions stipulated by the
parties to the agreement, and most importantly, 3) the best
interests of the child.
A genotypic approach would be fully consistent with the
proposals of the CAHR report [12], which would validate
that the gametes of one or both of the commissioning per-
son/s were in fact used to bring about the creation of that
child. Additionally, it would be important for Irish courts
to consider the intention of the parties at the time of the
agreement. Any decision may be supplemented by look-
ing to the 'intellectual conception' of the child and the
'but for' test (i.e., 'but for' the intention of the intended
parents, the child would have never existed).
Finally, we believe that the best interests of the child
should outrank the former criteria in assessing legal par-
entage/custody in all cases. This last element of the equa-
tion, admittedly subjective, gives appropriate deference to
the bench in quantifying the deciding factor in the out-
come of the case. If, based on all available evidence, an
Irish court determined that the birth mother (surrogate)
rather than the commissioning couple best served the
needs and interests of the child, then the previous two ele-
ments above would fail on such findings. However, if the
court were satisfied that in a traditional surrogacy arrange-
ment, both the birth mother and commissioning couple
equally were eligible for custody, then the courts decision
should rest on the first two factors in the Test.
Remedies
There are a number of ways both parties might breach a
surrogacy contract. For example, the commissioning cou-
ple could decide not to pay for the medical expenses of the
surrogate. Or, the surrogate might in some way intention-
ally harm the foetus by smoking or drinking during preg-
nancy. While these issues do not easily fall within the
scope of our analysis, the commissioning couple (in the
first scenario) may be held to be in breach of the terms of
the contract and thus, compelled to uphold (specific per-
formance) the terms of the contract. Similarly, in the sec-
ond scenario the surrogate would be in breach of the
express terms of the contract since it would be imperative
for the commissioning couple to choose a healthy host to
carry their child to full term. Accordingly, the surrogateReproductive Health 2008, 5:9 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/5/1/9
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may be liable to damages for emotional distress caused to
the intended parents. Regarding situations where the sur-
rogate refuses to relinquish custody of the child, what
relief is available to the commissioning person/s? Are con-
tractual remedies suitable in the context of surrogacy
arrangements and how may such remedies be quantified?
Damages
Would an award of damages be an acceptable remedy in a
surrogacy dispute? If so, how would the courts calculate
this bearing in mind they would be assessing such dam-
ages in relation to (or, in exchange for) the loss of one's
child? If legal parental custody of a child were to be
granted to the birth mother (surrogate), would it be mor-
ally just to order restitution to the commissioning couple
for the financial loss they had incurred, by directing reim-
bursement to them for 'expenses' and medical treatments
that they had paid to the surrogate (or her caregivers) dur-
ing the gestational period? If the court simply reimbursed
the commissioning couple for expenses, would this be a
favourable remedy? A specific set of facts could lead an
Irish court to decide that due to the child being partly that
of the surrogate (genetically), that the commissioning per-
son/s be required to pay for whatever expenses and costs
associated with the child's upbringing, but with parental
custody being assigned to the surrogate.
This scenario strongly favours the surrogate, and the com-
missioning person/s would find themselves in a situation
with considerably less than they started with, as they
would be forced to pay for offspring that they intended for
themselves but would be legally denied full access to. This
remedy appears unbalanced in that the surrogate would
ultimately receive two benefits compared to none for the
commissioning person/s, since the birth mother (surro-
gate) would enjoy the child as well as some form of guar-
anteed payment for its support. It is our belief that the
Irish courts should decide the issue of damages in light of
the party of whom it awards custody to:
￿ If the commissioning couple breach the terms of the
contract then the surrogate should only be awarded com-
pensation as per the terms of the contract, i.e., to put her
in the position she would have been in had the contract
been carried out fully. This would be in line with the rec-
ommendations of the CAHR report and the Adoption Acts
1952–1998.
￿ If the Surrogate breaches the contract (by refusing to
relinquish custody), the courts should award the commis-
sioning couple joint custody and a refund of all expenses
that were incurred (medical and other).
Specific Performance
The application of specific performance would generally
block the previous outcome by simply enforcing the
agreement in place between the signatories to the agree-
ment. The surrogate would, by court order, be forced to
comply with the full intentions and objectives of the con-
tract as stipulated therein, and therefore be obligated to
give the child over to the commissioning parents. This
judicial requirement of removing a baby from the bosom
of its birth mother may first appear somewhat callous and
indelicate, since the intrusion of legal manoeuvres near a
moment traditionally given great family, social, and spir-
itual significance is unsettling. But the background and
circumstances of such a birth would be quite different
here. Indeed, the highly specialised context of the surro-
gacy arrangement is itself unnatural, and the ultimate con-
clusion of the contract would have specifically called for
the bonds of motherhood to be reassigned to the commis-
sioning person/s as the essential condition of fulfilling the
agreement. Proper and total execution of the agreement
occurs only when the surrogate specifically performs the
tasks required of her, namely, by providing the commis-
sioning person/s with the child that they themselves had
conceptualised.
It must be admitted that for any future case in Ireland
involving this emotional alloy of contract, family, and
constitutional law, absolutes are difficult when determin-
ing the sensitive matter of parentage and child custody.
Yet by utilising the Three Point Test as presented previ-
ously, Irish courts could (in the absence of legislation)
render a just and equitable decision based on sound legal
principles.
Conclusion
Given the many advances in modern fertility therapies
and the wide availability of these treatments, the notion
of surrogacy finds itself on many social, family, religious
and political agendas. Recognition of surrogacy and its
important role in modern society is welcome, and today it
no longer carries the stigma of an earlier time. Surrogacy
is now optimistically viewed as being an acceptable
method of procreation "in circumstances where it would
otherwise not be possible". Irish courts dealing with a
future issue where the surrogate fails to relinquish custody
could apply the Three Point Test to consider genetic data
and the intention of the parties at the time of making the
contract. Account must also be taken of the best interests
of the child, as determined by experienced judges.
For judicial matters, we favour the Three Point Test over
existing expert committee opinions because there are
important inconsistencies between documents Irish
Courts might consider, including the CAHR Report [12]
and the Brazier Report [34]. The CAHR Report found 'pre-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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sumed' intention to be critical in assigning legal parent sta-
tus to the commissioning person/s, whereas the Brazier
Report recommended the surrogate mother be recognised
as the legal mother of the child irrespective of genetic
relatedness or original parental intention.
On legislative matters, we agree with the CAHR Report's
recommendation that the Oireachtas, in developing legis-
lation on surrogacy, should consider the consensual
nature of surrogacy arrangements, and, as such, the 'pre-
sumed intention' of parenthood should be sufficient to
grant the commissioning person/s legal parentage and
custody of the child. The Oireachtas will also need to con-
sider the unfavourable treatment of the commissioning
person/s in the United Kingdom, where surrogacy con-
tracts have been deemed unenforceable and would raise
questions here about one's Constitutionally-protected
right to procreate. This concern may be assuaged by appli-
cation of the Three Point Test (or some similar methodol-
ogy) as outlined here. For Ireland, this contract-based
approach combined with a respect for Constitutional fam-
ily rights may be regarded as a successful contribution to
surrogacy arrangements here.
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